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ON WHAT DISTINGUISHES NEW ORIGINALISM 
FROM OLD:  A JURISPRUDENTIAL TAKE 
Mitchell N. Berman* & Kevin Toh** 
 
“What [I] value[] is the Way, which goes beyond technique.  When I first 
began cutting up oxen, I did not see anything but oxen.  Three years later, 
I couldn’t see the whole ox.  And now, I encounter them with spirit and 
don’t look with my eyes.  Sensible knowledge stops and spiritual desires 
proceed.  I rely on the Heavenly patterns, strike in the big gaps, am guided 
by the large fissures, and follow what is inherently so.  I never touch a 
ligament or tendon, much less do any heavy wrenching!”1 
Butcher Ding in the Zhuangzi 
INTRODUCTION 
What is new originalism? In the influential article that popularized the 
term,2 Keith Whittington identified several features that, according to him, 
principally distinguish new originalism from old.  First, he observed, new 
originalists maintain that the proper target of originalist interpretation is the 
original public meaning of the constitutional text, as opposed to the 
Framers’ or ratifiers’ intentions or expectations.3  Second, new originalism 
is more concerned with the positive task of providing the basis of 
constitutional doctrines than with the negative task of subverting doctrines 
that allegedly were products of judicial excesses.4  Third, new originalism 
is less motivated by a commitment to judicial restraint, than by a concern to 
identify “what judges are supposed to be interpreting and what that 
implies.”5 
We believe that the third distinguishing feature (or something very close 
to it) is the nub of the matter.  It is the feature that amounts to “the center of 
 
*  Richard Dale Endowed Chair in Law, Professor of Philosophy, The University of Texas at 
Austin. 
**  Associate Professor of Philosophy, San Francisco State University.  We are grateful to 
the organizers, Saul Cornell, Abner Greene, and Ben Zipursky, for inviting us to participate 
in this Symposium, to fellow symposiasts and audience members for productive reactions to 
an early draft, and to Mark Greenberg for very helpful written comments.  
 1. J. David Velleman, The Way of the Wanton, in PRACTICAL IDENTITY AND NARRATIVE 
AGENCY 169, 183 (Kim Atkins & Catriona Mackenzie eds., 2008) (quoting Zhuangzi, in 
READINGS IN CLASSICAL CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 219–20 (Philip J. Ivanhoe & Bryan W. van 
Norden eds., 2001)). 
 2. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 599 (2004). 
 3. Id. at 609. 
 4. Id. at 608. 
 5. Id. at 609. 
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gravity,” if you will, of new originalism, and likely explains the other 
distinguishing features of that position, including the other two that 
Whittington enumerates.6  In a nutshell, old originalism was (chiefly) a 
theory of adjudication, whereas new originalism is (chiefly) a theory of law.  
Or so we will contend.  This Article is devoted to characterizing that 
distinction, defending our characterization, and explaining its importance.  
Along the way, we comment on what appears to be an important but as yet 
little noticed intramural disagreement within the new originalist camp.  
Simply put, Whittington and Larry Solum differ regarding what 
interpretation aims at, and thus what originalism, and more specifically 
what new originalism, is.  For the reasons that we shall enumerate, we side 
with Whittington’s position, or at least a reconstructed version of it, against 
Solum’s.  We end the Article with some admittedly tentative thoughts 
regarding the formidable theoretical obstacles that confront originalist 
theories of constitutional law. 
I.  DEFINING TERMS 
Pretheoretically, originalism is a theory, or family of theories, concerning 
constitutional interpretation.  This is true enough, we think, but not yet 
terribly helpful, for the phrase “constitutional interpretation” is notoriously 
equivocal.  As Richard Posner has noted, “[I]nterpretation is a portmanteau 
word so capacious that virtually nothing that a court might ‘do’ to or with a 
[text] could not be thought interpretation in a semantically permissible, 
indeed orthodox, sense.”7  So we start with some conceptual distinctions 
and terminological tidyings-up. 
A.  Interpretation, Adjudication, Law 
In a well-known 1997 article, Gary Lawson took pains to subdivide the 
broad and undifferentiated terrain of theories of constitutional interpretation 
into theories of interpretation proper and theories of adjudication.8  For 
Lawson, “[t]heories of interpretation concern the meaning of the 
Constitution,” whereas “[t]heories of adjudication concern the manner in 
which decisionmakers (paradigmatically public officials, such as judges) 
resolve disputes.”9  Theories of each type, he added, can be either 
descriptive or normative.  And “at the normative level,” he continued, “a 
theory of interpretation allows us to determine what the Constitution truly 
 
 6. That seems to be the case at least from the theoretical perspective.  From a 
practitioner’s perspective, the most significant difference between old and new originalism 
could be the first.  But as said in the text, it is our conjecture that other differences, including 
Whittington’s first, are ultimately traceable to the third difference that we will be 
highlighting. 
 7. Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation:  A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 
431, 448 (1989); see also, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional and Statutory 
Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 268, 
269–70 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). 
 8. See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823 
(1997). 
 9. Id. at 1823. 
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means, while a theory of adjudication allows us to determine what role, if 
any, the Constitution’s meaning should play in particular decisions.”10 
This is a helpful distinction.  But we believe that two additional 
refinements are necessary to reap the full benefits of the move that Lawson 
has made.  First, Lawson’s talk about “the meaning of the Constitution” 
when discussing theories of interpretation is ambiguous.  The “meaning” at 
which interpretation supposedly aims could be understood as either what 
could be called “semantic meaning,” or what could be called “legal 
meaning,” or perhaps both at once.  In other words, the relevant sense of 
“meaning” could refer to the meanings of the inscriptions in the 
constitutional text, or to the law—i.e. the legal requirements, permissions, 
and prohibitions—that the Constitution imposes, or both of these things.  
Let us further explain. 
The relevant ambiguity, far from being unique to Lawson, is close to 
ubiquitous in originalist writing.11  Originalists assume or take for granted 
—sometimes explicitly, but much more often implicitly in varying 
degrees—that the law that the Constitution imposes is equivalent to the 
semantic contents of the inscriptions in the constitutional text, and, 
consequently, that discerning the semantic contents of the constitutional 
text is equivalent to discovering the constitutional law.  To take just one 
example, Whittington contends, “An interpretation of a text attempts to 
capture the true meaning of the text.”12  But as Solum, an originalist, has 
recently perceptively observed, “It is at least conceivable that the meaning 
of the constitutional text and the content of the rules of constitutional law 
are not identical.”13  In other words, to equate the two is to take a 
substantive position. 
Lest there be any doubt, the substantive position here may be correct.  
(We believe that it isn’t, but we are not now assuming its incorrectness or 
saying anything that should stack the deck against this particular 
substantive position.)  What we point out, along with Solum, and further 
emphasize, is that it is something that needs to be substantiated and 
defended, and not something that can be taken for granted.14  If the 
 
 10. Id. at 1824. 
 11. And in nonoriginalist writing too.  One of us (Berman) pleads guilty to perpetuating 
this ambiguity in his own published work.  Among commentators, Mark Greenberg has 
been, perhaps, the most insistent and perceptive critic of the tendency of legal theorists to 
ignore the transition from semantic content to legal content. See, e.g., Mark Greenberg, 
Legislation As Communication?  Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic 
Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217 (Andrei 
Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) [hereinafter Greenberg, Legislation As 
Communication?]; Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, in 1 OXFORD 
STUD. PHIL. L. 39 (2011); Mark Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 157 
(2004) [hereinafter Greenberg, How Facts Make Law]. 
 12. Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 119, 121 (2010). 
 13. Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 923, 953 (2009). 
 14. Although we agree with Solum in noticing and highlighting the gap between 
semantic meaning and legal meaning, as we will discuss later in this Article, we disagree 
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substantive position were right, and if the constitutional law of the United 
States were, therefore, actually equivalent to the semantic meanings of the 
inscriptions in the constitutional text, then the perspicuous thing to say, in 
our view, would be that constitutional interpretation does attempt to 
discover the Constitution’s semantic meaning, and by way of the semantic 
meaning also its legal meaning, only because the text’s semantic meaning is 
its legal meaning—i.e., that the semantic meaning constitutes the law.15 
As we read him,16 Lawson is best understood as suggesting that 
normative theories of constitutional interpretation are in fact theories 
concerning the Constitution’s legal content, meaning, or significance.  
Consider, for instance, his insistence that “[o]ne must first determine, 
through interpretation, what the Constitution means,” and that only 
afterwards “can one determine whether the properly interpreted 
Constitution generates any political obligations.”17  Why is the second 
question whether the properly interpreted Constitution generates political 
obligations rather than legal obligations?  Precisely, we aver, because 
discovering what legal obligations the Constitution generates is the job 
handled by constitutional interpretation. 
A plausible case could be made that Whittington (at least some of the 
time) also conceives constitutional interpretation as an activity that aims at 
“legal meaning,” or the law.  “Interpretation[,]” he says, “attempts to divine 
 
with his way of conceiving the nature of constitutional interpretation in light of that gap. See 
infra Part III.B. 
 15. In fact, there is at least one further distinction to be made within the phenomena that 
we refer to indiscriminately in the text as “semantic meaning.”  As philosophers of language 
and linguists have observed over the years, there is a distinction between the meanings of 
sentences on the one hand, and what speakers communicate partly by way of those sentences 
on the other.  What a speaker communicates or conveys to his audience is not merely a 
function of the meanings of the sentences he uses, but also of the various contextual factors 
and various principles of language usage that he and his audience exploit together.  
Examples of such “pragmatic enrichment” are easy to find.  When a speaker asks a friend, 
after picking him up at the airport, “Have you eaten?” the speaker is clearly not asking him 
whether he has ever engaged in the activity of consuming food, but whether he has eaten in 
the last few hours or whether he is hungry now. See Scott Soames, Interpreting Legal Texts:  
What Is, and What Is Not, Special About the Law, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 403 (2009) 
[hereinafter Soames, Interpreting Legal Texts]; Scott Soames, The Gap Between Meaning 
and Assertion:  Why What We Literally Say Often Differs from What Our Words Literally 
Mean, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS, supra, at 278.   
  In the text, we ignore this distinction between semantic content proper and 
linguistically based communicative content, for this distinction does not make a difference 
for the points we are interested in making.  We are more concerned with the difference 
between either kind of linguistic content on the one hand and legal content on the other.  
Unfortunately in our view, Soames ignores this latter distinction while highlighting the 
former when he says:  “Since the content of the law includes everything asserted and 
conveyed in adopting the relevant legal texts, meaning is sometimes merely a guide to 
interpretation, to be supplemented by other things.” Soames, Interpreting Legal Texts, supra, 
at 408–09. 
 16. Conversations with Lawson suggest that this may not be precisely how he reads 
Lawson.  But because we are uncertain that we fully grasp his account of the relationship 
between semantic content and law, because he has allowed to us that his views on that 
question are idiosyncratic, and because the claims we most wish to make do not require it, 
we will stop short of a deeper foray into Lawson exegesis. 
 17. Lawson, supra note 8, at 1823 (emphasis added). 
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the meaning of the text.”18  So far, we might suspect that he is taking for 
granted the equivalence of semantic meaning and legal meaning in a way 
that we deem question begging.  But he continues as follows: 
There will be occasions, however, when the Constitution as written 
cannot in good faith be said to provide a determinate answer to a given 
question.  This is the realm of construction.  The process of interpretation 
may be able to constrain the available readings of the text and limit the 
permissible set of political options, but the interpreter may not be able to 
say that the text demands a specific result.19 
Because any “question” that arises during the course of constitutional 
adjudication would be a legal question, and because whatever “demands” 
the text would impose would be legal demands, this passage makes sense 
only on the assumption that Whittington implicitly acknowledges that 
interpretation sometimes fails to deliver “determinate [legal] answer[s],” 
and that it does not always specify with precision what “the text [legally] 
demands.”  Consider too Whittington’s speculations, for purposes of 
argument, “that, properly interpreted, the First Amendment does not protect 
seditious libel, the Second Amendment does not protect individual gun 
ownership, that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit execution by 
firing squad, or that the Thirteenth Amendment does not apply to ‘wage 
slavery’ and require rights of collective bargaining.”20  Whether some 
provision of the Constitution, “properly interpreted,” protects or prohibits 
this or that is a legal or normative matter, not a semantic one.  So 
constitutional interpretation can yield answers regarding what the 
Constitution protects or prohibits only if what it serves up is legal 
meaning—i.e., the law.21 
In short, we assume that constitutional interpretation—the activity that 
Lawson helpfully distinguishes from the broader activity of constitutional 
adjudication—aims at the Constitution’s legal meaning, which is to say that 
it aims, as Chief Justice Marshall put it in Marbury, to determine or 
ascertain “what the law is.”22  Incidentally, at the end of the day, we do not 
think that the term “legal meaning” is optimal, for it is a misnomer that 
encourages the tendency of legal theorists to conflate semantic facts with 
legal facts.23  It would be better, all things considered, to drop the 
terminology that suggests that the law is a type of meaning and to restrict 
 
 18. Whittington, supra note 12, at 120. 
 19. Id. at 120–21. 
 20. Id. at 125. 
 21. See also, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 4, 37–44 
(2001) (suggesting that interpretation proper is concerned with “identifying constitutional 
norms and specifying their meaning”; and endorsing the judgment that “constitutional 
meaning” for these purposes refers to “norms, values, or principles that the Constitution 
embodies,” not mere semantic or linguistic contents). 
 22. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 23. As Mark Greenberg reminded us, the terminology also encourages an assumption of 
the erroneous view that textual bits or sentences correspond one-to-one with legal norms.  A 
more plausible “holistic” view would hold that each legal norm is a function of a complex 
set of many facts, most probably including the meanings of many textual bits. 
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the term “meaning” to semantic facts proper.  It would also be better to 
eliminate the redundancy in the term “semantic meaning.”  But we retain 
and rely on this terminology in this Article in recognition of its wide usage 
in the literature. 
With that issue resolved (provisionally, as we will see), we proceed to the 
second of our two proposed refinements to Lawson’s distinction, which is 
to shift focus from how we should go about discovering the law to what the 
law really is or consists of.  Suppose, as appears to us, that what Lawson 
classifies as a normative theory of constitutional interpretation is a theory 
regarding how some persons (perhaps judges, perhaps everybody) should 
go about discovering what the constitutional law is, or what the law that the 
Constitution gives rise to is.  So understood, such a theory would aim to 
give guidance regarding how to conduct a particular inquiry.  It would be a 
theory of legal or constitutional epistemology.  Essential to appreciate is 
that such a theory must presuppose an account of what it is that we are 
trying to discover, which is to say that it must presuppose an account of 
what the law is or consists of.  Notice that scientific, mathematical, and 
moral questions are distinct from questions about how to conduct scientific, 
mathematical, and moral investigations, respectively.  We are here marking 
the analogous distinction in the legal domain. 
Some commentators have described the difference in vantage points that 
we are introducing as involving a shift from epistemology to metaphysics.24  
However, for reasons that would likely prove distracting to most of our 
intended audience, we are leery of the metaphysical label here.  We would 
prefer to describe the different types of theories or accounts as pertaining to 
legal epistemology on the one hand and law on the other, where a “theory 
of law” concerns the ultimate facts or principles that determine or constitute 
legal norms, or (in Hartian terms) the ultimate “criteria of legal validity.” 
What we have in mind will come across more clearly with the assistance 
of a few examples.  So consider the following (actual or hypothetical) 
“ordinary” propositions of constitutional law:  Congress has authority to 
regulate intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce in 
the aggregate; people, in their individual capacities, have a constitutional 
right to bear arms; legislative redistricting that is motivated by excessive 
partisanship is unconstitutional.  Constitutional lawyers do not think that 
norms or propositions like these are constitutionally “primitive” in the sense 
of being ultimate.  Rather, constitutional propositions like these are 
determined, constituted, or validated by legal facts or principles that are 
more fundamental. 
That is to say, part of what makes it the case that these statements express 
true or correct propositions or norms of constitutional law are other, more 
ultimate, legal facts or principles, such as:  the national government has 
lawful authority adequate to promote the nation’s economic well-being and 
 
 24. See, e.g., Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, supra note 11, at 178 (describing an 
account of the determination relationship—what he calls a “model”—as “the counterpart at 
the metaphysical level of a method of interpretation at the epistemic level”). 
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its competitiveness in global markets; what constitutional provisions say is 
ordinarily the law even in the face of profound social and technological 
changes that would make such legal rules significantly less optimal today; 
and legislators may not create electoral rules that are designed to promote 
the electoral advantage of particular individuals or parties.  We are not 
here endorsing any of these particular principles, which we offer just for the 
sake of illustration.  What we are claiming is that a normative theory of 
constitutional interpretation must presuppose a theory of the ultimate 
determinants or criteria of validity of our law. 
The final important point is that, when it comes to theories of 
constitutional interpretation (in the narrower sense that is distinguishable 
from theories of adjudication), the theory or account of fundamental legal 
principles or facts that is presupposed is of vastly more interest and 
significance than is the epistemological theory that lies at the surface.  To 
anticipate just a bit, suppose that an originalist position on this legal 
question is that the constitutional law in a case of first judicial impression is 
fully determined by what the authors of the constitutional text intended to 
say, or by what a hypothetical reasonable person at the time of ratification 
of a provision would have understood the authors to have said.  The 
originalist’s epistemological position—her “normative theory of 
interpretation”—would then direct how decisionmakers should go about 
determining (in the sense of discovering) what the authors did intend to say 
or what a hypothetical reasonable person would have understood the 
authors to have said. 
To be sure, there are some things, not all of them obvious or 
uncontroversial, to be said on that score.  But perhaps not very many—and 
certainly not many that are actively disputed in the literature on 
constitutional interpretation.  After all, nonoriginalists rarely dispute 
originalists’ views about how we should go about finding out what the 
Framers intended or what a hypothetical reasonable member of the text’s 
original audience would have taken the text to mean, or similar such things, 
to the extent they matter.  Consequently, a theory of constitutional 
interpretation understood as a theory that concerns in some respect what the 
law is, is ordinarily far less about how to ascertain that which is to be 
ascertained and far more about what it is that we should endeavor to 
ascertain. It is for this reason that Stanley Fish, an intentionalist, routinely 
emphasizes that intentionalism is “not a method.”25  Instead, it is the thesis 
that “a text means what its author intends.”26  That is the significant claim.  
If it is true, he explains, then “many of the debates about how legal 
interpretation should proceed lose their urgency and become evidence of 
just how strong a hold a mistake may have on an entire discipline.”27 
 
 25. Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 643 (2005) 
[hereinafter Fish, There Is No Textualist Position]; see also, e.g., Stanley Fish, The 
Intentionalist Thesis Once More, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 99, 99 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
 26. Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, supra note 25, at 645. 
 27. Id. 
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We do not share Fish’s intentionalism as a claim about the (semantic) 
meaning of a text.  Much less do we share his assumption that the semantic 
meaning of a legal text fully determines what the law is, or what 
contribution the enactment of that text makes to the content of the law.  We 
do, however, fully share his insistence that we should be talking more, and 
more explicitly, about what it is that we should be looking for and less 
about how we should undertake that investigation.  Accordingly, we think 
that the more illuminating nomenclature for marking the contrast that 
Lawson helpfully highlighted involves distinguishing theories of 
adjudication from theories of law, and not from theories of interpretation.  
Indeed, this is a fairly common way to carve things up in the jurisprudential 
literature.28  For purposes of this Article, we define such theories as 
follows: 
Theories of law are theories of the ultimate criteria of legal validity, or of 
the ultimate determinants of legal content—i.e., theories regarding what it 
is that gives the law in any given jurisdiction the content that it has. 
Theories of constitutional adjudication are theories of what judges should 
do in the course of resolving constitutional disputes.  Theories of 
adjudication presumably will include, though need not be reducible to, 
accounts of how some class of persons (paradigmatically judges) should 
try to determine or discover the Constitution’s legal content, or what it is 
that the constitutional law provides.  Such accounts could be termed 
theories of constitutional interpretation proper. 
When somebody purports to be advancing a “theory of constitutional 
interpretation,” it is useful to pause to ask whether, or in what respects, her 
theory is most faithfully classified as a theory of law, a theory of 
constitutional interpretation proper, or as a theory of adjudication. 
To see how the views might combine, consider this very incomplete 
sketch of a familiar set of views:  (1) the semantic meaning of the 
constitutional text fully determines or constitutes the Constitution’s legal 
meaning or effect; (2) when trying to ascertain the semantic meaning of the 
constitutional text, courts should consult Founding-era dictionaries and may 
draw inferences from historical practices contemporaneous with ratification 
of the text; and (3) when adjudicating disputes, courts should enforce the 
law, except that they may craft doctrinal rules or tests (think of equal 
protection law’s “tiers of scrutiny” and the myriad of rules that courts have 
developed under the First Amendment, for example) designed to facilitate 
judicial implementation or enforcement of the law, even if such 
implementing doctrines have the effect of underenforcing or overenforcing 
constitutional norms. 
Proposition (1) would belong to a theory of (constitutional) law; 
proposition (2) would belong to that portion of a theory of (constitutional) 
adjudication properly described as a theory of interpretation; and 
 
 28. See, e.g., SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 247–48 (2011); Joseph Raz, Postema on Law’s 
Autonomy and Public Practical Reasons:  A Critical Comment, 4 LEGAL THEORY 1 (1998). 
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proposition (3) would belong to that portion of a theory of (constitutional) 
adjudication that lies outside its theory of interpretation.29 
B.  New Originalism and “New Originalism” Distinguished 
We will argue in the next Part that new originalism is predominantly a 
theory of law, and not of adjudication, as we have just explained those 
notions.  But we suspect that merely to announce that thesis will 
immediately provoke skepticism from readers who are familiar with the so-
called interpretation/construction distinction and view it as partly definitive 
of new originalism. Indeed, in his contribution to this symposium, Larry 
Solum identifies the embrace of that distinction, and the concomitant 
assignment of an important role to the activity denominated construction, as 
one of two factors that distinguish new originalism from old.30  While the 
new originalists’ account of constitutional interpretation is (or might be) 
properly characterized as pertaining to a theory of law, the objection we 
have in mind would go,  the notion of constitutional construction that they 
highlight and deploy surely belongs to the domain of adjudication.  
Accordingly, it might be thought, given the centrality of construction to 
new originalist thought, we should conclude that new originalism is very 
much a theory of adjudication and not (merely) a theory of law.31  
Whittington himself makes clear that a theory of interpretation must be 
supplemented by a theory of construction precisely to fill out the picture of 
adjudication.32 
We agree that, when conducted by courts as opposed to other 
governmental actors,33 construction does belong to a theory of adjudication 
and not to a theory of law.  How then can we maintain that new originalism 
is a theory of law and not of adjudication? 
The answer to this modest puzzle depends upon distinguishing “new 
originalism” from “New Originalism.”  As we use these phrases, the former 
is an imprecise but possibly useful term of art that denotes a stage in the 
 
 29. For further discussion of these types of theories, see Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin 
Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1739 
(2013). 
 30. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013).  The other factor is the first one emphasized by Whittington:  
that the target of interpretation is original public meaning and not Framers’ intentions. 
 31. Some new originalists, Whittington in particular, emphasize that construction is a 
task for nonjudicial as well as judicial actors. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION:  DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1 (1999).  Therefore, it 
would be more accurate to describe construction as pertaining to a theory of 
“implementation” that encompasses, but is not exhausted by, implementation-by-
adjudication. 
 32. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 12. 
 33. In his initial work on the subject, Constitutional Construction:  Divided Powers and 
Constitutional Meaning, Whittington focused heavily on constitutional construction by 
nonjudicial actors, thereby inviting the impression that construction is, in his view, a task 
only for the political branches.  He has subsequently made clear that that is not his view. 
Compare WHITTINGTON, supra note 31, at 1, with Whittington, supra note 12, at 127–29.  It 
is assuredly not the view of others who have embraced the interpretation-construction 
distinction. 
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development of a general idea or thesis (the general thesis denominated 
“originalism”), whereas the latter is a proper name referring to what is, 
loosely speaking, a school that subscribes to a concatenation of views, 
including a particular version of originalism and supplementary claims 
about constitutional construction.  In order to prevent any unnecessary 
confusion, we shall use the term “neo-originalism” henceforth to refer to 
what we have so far been calling “new originalism.”  The “new 
originalism” (lower case) of our title, which had to be capitalized because 
of typographical conventions, is what we are now calling “neo-
originalism.”  New Originalists endorse neo-originalism and also believe 
that constitutional adjudication includes construction as well as 
interpretation.  The notion of constitutional construction is a part of the 
New Originalist platform, if you will, but not a part of neo-originalism, 
which is the brand of originalism that New Originalists endorse. 
We have two principal reasons for locating the New Originalist theory of 
construction outside the boundaries of originalism, properly understood.  
First, this is what prominent New Originalists have themselves said.  
Whittington has explained, “originalism is incomplete as a theory of how 
the Constitution is elaborated and applied over time.  Although originalism 
may indicate how the constitutional text should be interpreted, it does not 
exhaust what we might want to do and have done with that text.”34  Yet 
more pointedly, he adds, “Construction is a necessary feature of 
constitutionalism, and originalism can accept it as a supplementary theory 
of constitutional elaboration.”35  The New Originalist Randy Barnett 
similarly emphasizes:  “Originalism is not a theory of what to do when 
original meaning runs out.”36  A theory of constitutional construction, we 
take it, is designed to serve that additional function. 
Second, and more substantively, a theory of construction can be, and in 
fact is, shared by originalists and nonoriginalists alike—as Whittington, 
again, has recognized.37  This can be seen by contrasting the standard or 
orthodox model of constitutional adjudication with a competing picture that 
one of us has dubbed the “two-output” model.38 
According to the standard account (represented on the left in Figure 1, 
below), courts do (or legitimately do) only two things in the course of 
constitutional adjudication:  first, they interpret the Constitution to 
determine what the law is; second, they apply the constitutional norms that 
 
 34. Whittington, supra note 2, at 611 (emphasis added). 
 35. Id. at 612 (emphasis added). 
 36. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 
69 (2011). 
 37. See Whittington, supra note 12, at 120 n.3 (noting that keeping theories of 
construction outside of originalism properly understood allows them to be of use to persons 
who eschew originalist theories of interpretation or of law); Keith E. Whittington, On 
Pluralism Within Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 25, at 70, 76 
(“The distinction between interpretation and construction does not depend on accepting 
originalism as the appropriate approach to interpretation.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output Thesis, 119 
HARV. L. REV. F. 220 (2006). 
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interpretation delivers to the facts to produce a case-specific holding.  In 
contrast, the two-output model (represented on the right in Figure 1) 
emphasizes that, even before they come to apply legal norms to case-
specific facts, courts routinely, and by necessity and with legitimacy, 
engage in two conceptually or logically distinct tasks:  they try to discover 
the content of legal norms to which the Constitution gives rise; and they 
craft legal rules, tests, or doctrines in order to implement, administer, or 
enforce the discovered legal norms.  This is true not only of controversial 
judicially crafted doctrines like the Miranda39 warnings and Roe v. 
Wade’s40 trimester rule.  It is true as well of literally countless 
constitutional doctrines that strike most constitutional lawyers and scholars 
as utterly unremarkable—from the tiers of scrutiny that implement, or give 
effect to, the Equal Protection Clause; to Fourth Amendment tests that have 
the effect of supplanting a single general norm of reasonableness with more 
sharp-edged rules for specific contexts (like automobiles or borders); to the 
many rational basis tests and similar doctrines that direct courts to accord 
some measure of deference to decisions made by political actors; and on 
and on.  
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 40. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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This “two-output” model is increasingly accepted by originalists and 
nonoriginalists alike.  Indeed, one of us, an avowed nonoriginalist, has 
defended a version of it at length in previous work.41  We will explain 
below that (at least in Whittington’s hands) “construction” is essentially the 
step in the two-output model of the right-hand diagram that (in an effort to 
avoid the appearance of taking early sides between originalists and 
nonoriginalists) we labeled “creation.”  Insofar as this is so, there is nothing 
about the construction part of the New Originalist package that is particular 
to originalism. 
Our claim, accordingly, will be that neo-originalism is centrally a theory 
of law.  New Originalism is a portfolio of views that contains as its central 
element the neo-originalist theory of law, and also contains a theory of 
adjudication that supplements that theory of law.  Significantly, that theory 
of adjudication assigns a prominent role to the notion of construction that, 
strictly speaking, lies outside of originalism’s boundaries and is actually 
shared by some nonoriginalist positions.  Because we are interested here in 
how neo-originalism differs from old originalism, and not in those aspects 
of New Originalism that fall outside of neo-originalism, we will take the 
liberty of identifying as neo-originalists theorists who might not self-
identify as New Originalists. 
II.  ORIGINALISM, OLD AND NEW 
In this Part, we provide evidence for our two-part claim that older 
originalism was principally a normative theory of constitutional 
adjudication and that most of the more recent originalist theorizing 
advances an account of what determines or constitutes legal norms.  In 
doing so, we also emphasize that this is a generalization that admits of 
exceptions. 
A.  A First Glance 
As Whittington rightly says, older originalist writings were chiefly driven 
by concern with judicial subjectivity.42  The central first generation 
originalist claim, pressed repeatedly, was that originalist interpretation is 
required because it is the only effective way to keep judges—especially the 
willful liberal justices of the Warren and Burger Courts—from resolving 
constitutional disputes based on their personal predilections and subjective 
value choices. 
For example, in the passage from his classic 1971 article that comes the 
closest, among then-contemporary statements, to articulating what would 
 
 41. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 38; Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision 
Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility:  Piercing the 
Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487 (2004); Mitchell N. Berman, 
Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2005). 
 42. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  For much the same claim, see also, for 
example, John Harrison, Forms of Originalism and the Study of History, 26 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 83 (2003); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of 
the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003). 
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become known as originalism, Robert Bork argued, “Where constitutional 
materials do not clearly specify the value to be preferred, there is no 
principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any other.  The judge 
must stick close to the text and the history, and their fair implications, and 
not construct new rights.”43  Similarly, Ed Meese explained and defended 
the Reagan Administration’s “jurisprudence of original intention” on the 
ground that “the original meaning of constitutional provisions and statutes 
[is] the only reliable guide for judgment. . . .  [O]nly ‘the sense in which the 
Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation,’” Meese continued, 
“and only the sense in which laws were drafted and passed, provide a solid 
foundation for adjudication.”44  Lastly, observing that “the main danger in 
judicial interpretation of the Constitution . . . is that the judges will mistake 
their own predilections for the law,” Justice Scalia advocated “the 
‘originalist’ approach to constitutional interpretation” as “the lesser evil” in 
large measure because it “does not aggravate the principal weakness of the 
system, for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite 
separate from the preferences of the judge himself.”45 
Notice that all of these passages facially amount to claims about how 
judges should behave, or what they should do.  At least on their faces, they 
advocate normative theories of adjudication rather than theories about what 
are the ultimate criteria of validity for constitutional law, or (put slightly 
differently) of what are the ultimate determinants of the contents of 
constitutional norms or propositions.  For Bork, the judge must stick close 
to text and history not because text and history alone constitute the law but 
because any departures would be unprincipled.46  For Meese, original 
meaning or intentions should be followed not because they ultimately 
determine the law but because they alone provide a “reliable guide for 
judgment” or “a solid foundation for adjudication.”47  For Scalia, 
originalism is “the lesser evil,” not because it is predicated on the correct 
understanding of what the law is, but because it is “more compatible with 
the nature and purpose of the Constitution in a democratic system” and 
because its “practical defects” are less damning than are the practical 
defects that bedevil nonoriginalism.48 
Of course, it is certainly possible that these positions entail, imply, or 
assume certain views about what the determinants of the law are.  But three 
things should be emphasized.  First, and to repeat, that is not what these 
writers say.  Indeed, as the preceding paragraph aims to show, it is 
conspicuously not what the above quoted passages say.  Second, translating 
 
 43. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 8 (1971). 
 44. Edwin Meese III, U.S. Attorney Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association 
(July 9, 1985) in ORIGINALISM:  A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47, 54 (Steven G. 
Calabresi ed., 2007). 
 45. Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852, 863–64 
(1989). 
 46. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 47. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 48. Scalia, supra note 45, at 862–63. 
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what they say into implicit claims about the ultimate criteria of legal 
validity or the ultimate determinants of legal contents hardly projects to be 
a straightforward or seamless business.  For one thing, the reasons that the 
relevant writers give for their proposals regarding proper adjudication look 
like the wrong sorts of reasons to undergird theories of law.  For example, 
the fact that a scrupulous adherence to what is demanded by original intents 
dramatically constrains judges’ discretion and willfulness, even if true, is 
not an obvious reason for concluding that that particular posture delivers 
true or correct legal norms. 
Third, in contending that the old originalists were principally advancing a 
theory of adjudication, we are not painting them in a worse light, or even a 
different one, than the one in which we would also paint their chief 
antagonists—not neo-originalists, but nonoriginalists.  Since substantiating 
this claim fully would consume more space than the effort would be worth, 
we here limit ourselves to a couple of examples.  Consider, Justice Breyer’s 
admonition that “the Court should interpret written words . . . in the 
Constitution . . . ,” and more generally, use the “traditional legal tools, such 
as text, history, tradition, precedent, and purposes and related 
consequences” to “help make the law effective in practice.”49  In a broadly 
similar vein, albeit one that valorizes judicial precedent decidedly more 
heavily, David Strauss recommends the “common law approach”—namely, 
“[r]easoning from precedent, with occasional resort to basic notions of 
fairness and good policy”—as both the actual and proper “way of resolving 
legal issues,” including those implicating “constitutional questions.”50  
Nonoriginalist theories or approaches such as these certainly appear to offer 
prescriptions regarding how judges should undertake the task of 
constitutional adjudication, and not accounts of the ultimate criteria of legal 
validity, or of the ultimate determinants of the contents of legal norms. 
With these clarifications and qualifications in mind, contrast the early or 
“old” originalist claims (and common nonoriginalist claims too, for that 
matter) with passages from the more recent originalist theorists.  To start, 
take Vasan Kesavan and Michael Paulsen, who contend, 
It is simply not consistent with the idea of the Constitution as binding law 
to adopt a hermeneutic of textualism that permits individuals to assign 
their own private, potentially idiosyncratic meanings to the words and 
phrases of the Constitution.  The meaning of the words and phrases of the 
Constitution as law is necessarily fixed as against private assignments of 
meaning.51 
And in a statement whose clarity (for our purposes) could hardly be 
improved upon, Steven Calabresi and Sai Prakash maintain, “Originalists 
do not give priority to the plain dictionary meaning of the Constitution’s 
 
 49. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK:  A JUDGE’S VIEW 73–74 (2010). 
 50. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 43, 47 (2010). 
 51. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 42, at 1130 (emphasis added). 
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text because they like grammar more than history.  They give priority to it 
because they believe that it and it alone is law.”52 
In these passages, originalism clearly serves as a theory of law:  insofar 
as judges should follow or enforce some fixed original aspect of the 
constitutional text, they should do so because that fixed aspect—“the plain 
dictionary meaning,” in the estimation of Calabresi and Prakash—is the 
law.  This is representative, we believe, of the neo-originalist thinking.  As 
the originalist Steven Smith has observed, “originalism insists (with some 
arguable lapses . . .) that what counts as law—as valid, enforceable law—is 
what human beings enact, and that the meaning of that law is what those 
human beings understood it to be.”53  According to Smith’s conception, 
which we deem accurate, contemporary or neo-originalism is principally a 
theory about “what counts as law.”54 
It is no accident that originalism has evolved from a theory about the 
principles that judges should follow when adjudicating legal disputes to a 
theory about what the law is.  There is good reason for it.  If originalism is 
only a theory of adjudication, and not instead centered on an account of the 
ultimate criteria or determinants of our constitutional law, then its claimed 
superiority relative to the alternatives becomes plausible only when those 
alternatives are grossly caricatured.  This is why old originalists routinely 
presented the choice facing legal interpreters as binary:  either strict 
adherence to the original meaning or intent, or wholly unconstrained 
wishful thinking—“the heavens or the abyss,” as Dan Farber and Suzanna 
Sherry aptly put it.55  That is surely a naively limited characterization of the 
possibilities, one that gains whatever apparent plausibility it might enjoy 
from a worldview that imagines all nonoriginalists as Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, and none as, say, Justice Breyer or Souter.  In contrast, if 
originalism were a theory of law then the conclusion that it is right and all 
competing accounts are wrong would not depend upon indefensible 
characterizations of those competitors.  It is plausible that this is a matter 
that by its nature admits of only one right answer. 
To be sure, we do not deny that hints (or more) of a theory of law can be 
found in early originalist writings.  In fact, we think that Raoul Berger, as 
important an old originalist as can be found, is best read as maintaining not 
only (or even principally) that the intentions of the Framers provide a useful 
or reliable guide for judicial decisionmaking in a democracy, but that they 
constitute what the constitutional law is.56  But insofar as this is his view, 
he lacked the theoretical sophistication, or even the instinct, to advance 
much in the way of argument for it.  In any event, our goal here is to 
 
 52. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 552 (1994). 
 53. Steven D. Smith, Reply to Koppelman:  Originalism and the (Merely) Human 
Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 189, 193 (2010). 
 54. Id. 
 55. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS:  PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3 (2009). 
 56. See generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:  THE TRANSFORMATION 
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describe and highlight two strands of originalist thinking, not to mark a 
sharp or crisp boundary between the two. 
B.  The Distinction Is Not Strictly Temporal 
To be a little more precise, our goal is to mark two strands of originalist 
thinking that we believe are fairly, if imperfectly, associated with different 
historical stages in the development of originalism.  By and large, we 
maintain, first generation originalists advocated judicial adherence to some 
fixed originalist object for reasons that did not depend upon any particular 
view about the ultimate criteria or determinants of constitutional law.  
Many or most originalists of subsequent generations, in contrast, have 
relied in the first instance precisely on the fundamental legal view that the 
constitutional law is determined by, or is entirely a function of, certain 
unchanging historical facts.  This contention belongs to a theory of law.  
Insofar as these neo-originalists believe, with the older originalists, that 
judges should adhere to the original meaning or intention, that claim about 
adjudication follows from the relatively uninteresting premise—substantive 
and contestable, to be sure, but not terribly controversial as a matter of 
fact—that judges should (more or less) enforce the law.57 
At the risk of belaboring, we are not saying that old originalism is 
incompatible with the neo-originalist account of the ultimate criteria or 
determinants of law, or that old originalists rejected or would have rejected 
that account.  Nor are we saying that neo-originalists end up prescribing 
forms of judicial behavior significantly different from what old originalists 
prescribed.  Our key claim concerns explanatory priority.  Old originalism 
argued for a theory of adjudication and was not committed to any 
implications such a theory might have for a theory of law.  Neo-originalism 
argues primarily for a theory of law and only derivatively and contingently 
for a theory of adjudication. 
The generalization can be highlighted by briefly recognizing some 
exceptions—older originalists whose views are more clearly grounded in an 
account of law, and newer originalists whose views seem mostly motivated 
by commitments regarding adjudication.  Lino Graglia is an example of the 
former.  His commitment to originalism, Graglia explains, is rooted in what 
he considers a “very simple” proposition, “almost a tautology:  the Supreme 
Court should not hold anything unconstitutional that is not unconstitutional, 
i.e., that is not, in fact, prohibited by the Constitution.”58  And what the 
Constitution prohibits, he continues, depends entirely on whatever norm the 
 
 57. The parenthetical is needed to accommodate both the near-universal acceptance of 
some doctrines of justiciability that effectively direct courts not to enforce the law, and the 
more limited, but growing, embrace of a “two-output” picture of proper constitutional 
adjudication, along with recognition that some legitimate or even optimal constructed 
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underenforcement, see, of course, Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure:  The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
 58. Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 631, 634 
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authors of the constitutional text “intended to convey.”59  Although a 
contemporary of Bork, Meese, and Scalia, and thus plainly an “older” 
originalist, chronologically speaking, Graglia grounds his advocacy of 
originalist adjudication squarely on an account, if more asserted than argued 
for, of the ultimate criteria or determinants of law. 
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport exemplify the other possibility.  
They are energetic and respected contributors to the current theoretical 
defenses of originalism who are, at the same time, throwbacks.  McGinnis 
and Rappaport foreground a normative theory of adjudication and 
background jurisprudential claims about the ultimate criteria or 
determinants of the law.  Their “normative defense of originalism,” as they 
call it, is chiefly premised on the pragmatic or consequentialist argument 
“that originalism advances the welfare of the present day citizens of the 
United States because it promotes constitutional interpretations that are 
likely to have better consequences today than those of nonoriginalist 
theories.”60  Loosely speaking, this is an argument about why judges should 
render originalist decisions or interpret the Constitution in an originalist 
manner. It is hard to make sense of this as an argument about the ultimate 
criteria of legal validity or determinants of the content of the existing law. 
III.  THE NEO-ORIGINALIST ACCOUNT OF THE ULTIMATE CRITERIA OR 
DETERMINANTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Here, we try to make more precise the account of law that neo-
originalists assert.  After doing so, we acknowledge that this account differs 
from that put forth by the influential New Originalists Larry Solum and 
Randy Barnett, and we explain why the competing account of constitutional 
interpretation that they advocate should be favored by neither originalists 
nor nonoriginalists. 
A.  Another First Glance 
We have just argued that neo-originalists (an analytical classification that 
highly correlates with, but is not reducible to, a temporal one) are centrally 
committed to a claim about the ultimate criteria or determinants of 
constitutional law.  To a first approximation, we can represent this neo-
originalist thesis as follows: 
(OL) The constitutional law ultimately consists solely of (some form of) 
the fixed semantic meanings of the inscriptions in the constitutional 
text. 
This is only a first approximation of the core new originalist claim about the 
ultimate criteria or determinants of constitutional law and is susceptible to 
improvements.  Significantly, it makes no allowance for the possibility that 
judicial decisions purporting to implement the Constitution also contribute 
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to the content of constitutional law even in the absence of any textual 
provision in the constitutional text that permits such contributions.  Few 
originalists would deny this possibility or actuality, however, 
notwithstanding that some also believe that courts should not continue to 
abide by judicial precedents that depart from the norms constituted by fixed 
semantic meanings of the constitutional text. 
An alternative rendering of the central neo-originalist thesis that better 
accommodates this additional set of ultimate determinants of the content of 
constitutional law could be formulated as follows: 
(OLˈ) The constitutional law ultimately consists of (some form of) the 
fixed semantic meanings of the inscriptions in the constitutional 
text, though judicial precedents that depart from the fixed 
semantic meanings of the inscriptions in the constitutional text are 
legally authoritative for nonjudicial actors and for inferior 
judges.61 
To repeat, we believe that all neo-originalists, in virtue of being neo-
originalists, accept (OL) or (OLˈ), or something quite close to them.  But 
the phrase “(some form of) the fixed semantic meaning” is intended to be 
ecumenical among original public meaning (advocated in one form or 
another by Steven Calabresi, Michael Paulsen, the self-described New 
Originalists, and others), authorially intended meaning (advocated by 
intentionalists such as Larry Alexander, Stanley Fish, and Richard Kay), 
and any roughly similar constructs. 
From what we have said in Part I, however, it follows that (OL) and 
(OLˈ) are distinct from claims that belong to a theory of adjudication with 
respect to which neo-originalists may differ from each other.  Consider, for 
example, these claims with respect to which neo-originalists in good 
standing disagree: 
(D) Courts are duty-bound to enforce the constitutional law insofar as it 
is discoverable. 
(C) Courts act properly in supplementing, in suitably cabined ways, the 
legal norms that result from legal interpretations with implementing 
rules or devices that they generate through constitutional 
constructions. 
While Lawson insists that (D) requires argumentation that originalism 
itself, properly understood, does not supply, other originalists believe it is a 
nonoptional part of originalism.  Nelson Lund, for example, describes his 
own “very simple-minded view of judicial duty in constitutional cases” 
thusly:  “Supreme Court Justices should just apply the law. . . .  If I had to 
 
 61. As formulated, (OLˈ) might be taken to carry the pragmatic implicature that 
Supreme Court justices are not bound by precedents that depart from textual meaning.  We 
hereby cancel that implicature.  Neo-originalists are divided and unclear about the precise 
legal status of judicial precedents that depart from or contradict the fixed semantic meanings 
or communicative contents of textual inscriptions.  (OLˈ) is our good-faith and first-pass 
attempt to capture what many or most seem to have in mind.  But a precise statement must 
be provided by those who endorse the view. 
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put a label on my own position, it would be ‘originalism.’  The Constitution 
is a written document that means what its words, in context, would 
reasonably have been understood to mean at the time it was adopted.”62  
And as our previous discussion of construction indicates, New Originalists 
such as Whittington, Barnett, and Solum among others have argued 
forcefully for (C), while McGinnis and Rappaport, among others, reject it. 
Be that as it may, our central contention, again, is that neo-originalists are 
committed to (OL) or (OLˈ).  Indeed, it is precisely neo-originalism’s 
commitment to some such thesis that distinguishes it from old originalism.  
As we emphasized toward the end of the preceding Part, old originalism is 
largely compatible with (OL) or (OLˈ), and we conjecture that many old 
originalists would have found these theses congenial and would have 
accepted them if they had actually considered the relevant question.  But 
such counterfactual acceptance of or reliance on (OL) or (OLˈ) is not what 
distinguishes neo-originalism from its forbear; it instead is what 
distinguishes originalism from nonoriginalism. 
That is how things look to us.  Before we can be confident of this claim, 
however, we must address a competing view advanced by some prominent 
New Originalists that has not attracted quite the attention we believe it 
warrants.  As we read them, the writings of two of the most respected and 
influential recent originalist theorists, Larry Solum and Randy Barnett, 
suggest that originalism is not committed to (OL) or (OLˈ) or anything in 
their vicinity.  In the remainder of this Part, we show how Solum and 
Barnett reach that heterodox conclusion and we explain why we believe 
they are mistaken. 
B.  Interpretation Reconsidered 
Recall what we argued in Part I.  Following Lawson and Whittington, we 
said that (1) neo-originalist theories of constitutional interpretation concern 
constitutional meaning; (2) the constitutional meaning at which 
constitutional interpretation aims is (for neo-originalists as for many others) 
its “legal” meaning or significance; therefore (3) neo-originalist theories of 
constitutional interpretation concern the determinants of constitutional law, 
which is why their theories of constitutional interpretation are fairly, and 
more perspicuously, described as theories of constitutional law.  And what 
view of the ultimate criteria or determinants of constitutional law do neo-
originalists advance?  That is the view captured (more or less) by (OL) or 
(OLˈ). 
None of this, we think, will surprise many readers.  Consider the “fairly 
basic definition of originalism” that Whittington offered a decade ago:  
“Originalism regards the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the 
time of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional 
interpretation in the present.”63  Disambiguating the ambiguity that we 
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noted in Part I, we interpret this to be broadly equivalent to:  originalism 
regards the original semantic meaning of the constitutional text to be legally 
authoritative, in the sense that it constitutes what the law is (subject to the 
qualifications that (OLˈ) or its kin would introduce). 
Solum, however, denies (2)—that the constitutional meaning at which 
constitutional interpretation aims is its legal meaning or significance.  “The 
basic idea” that undergirds the interpretation-construction distinction, he 
explains in a recent article, depends upon a distinction between 
two different moments or stages that occur when an authoritative legal 
text (a constitution, statute, regulation, or rule) is applied or explicated.  
The first of these moments is interpretation—which I shall stipulate is the 
process (or activity) that recognizes or discovers the linguistic meaning or 
semantic content of the legal text.  The second moment is construction—
which I shall stipulate is the process that gives a text legal effect (either 
my [sic] translating the linguistic meaning into legal doctrine or by 
applying or implementing the text). . . .  Although the terminology (the 
words “interpretation” and “construction” that express the distinction) 
could vary, legal theorists cannot do without the distinction.64 
Notice two things.  First, once again, Solum helpfully draws attention to the 
ambiguity that we identified in Part I by asking:  what type of meaning—
semantic or legal—does interpretation aim at?  Second, he expressly 
resolves that question in the way opposite to how we have claimed that it is 
usually resolved.  Succinctly put, according to Solum, “interpretation yields 
semantic content”; it is the job of construction, and construction alone, and 
not interpretation, to “determine[] legal content or legal effect.”65  
Significantly, this is true even when the semantic meaning is readily 
discoverable, unambiguous, and not vague. 
To appreciate the significance and exceptional nature of this claim, 
contrast it with the following characterization of neo-originalism offered by 
Amy Barrett in an introduction to a recent symposium: 
[N]ew [or neo-]originalists do not contend that the Constitution’s original 
public meaning is capable of resolving every constitutional question.  The 
Constitution’s provisions are written at varying levels of generality.  
When the original public meaning of the text establishes a broad principle 
rather than a specific legal rule, interpretation alone cannot settle a 
dispute.  In that event, the need for construction arises.66 
There is nothing unusual about this description; similar descriptions 
abound.  Yet it does not get Solum’s version of neo-originalism quite right.  
For Solum, it is never the function of constitutional interpretation to yield 
legal norms:  “construction also occurs in situations where it is overlooked 
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2013] WHAT DISTINGUISHES NEW ORIGINALISM FROM OLD 565 
or invisible, because interpretation has already done the work.”67  
Interpretation alone can never “settle a (legal) dispute” because it is never 
its function to deliver the law.  Barnett’s characterizations of the two 
adjudicative processes or activities echo Solum’s:  “Interpretation is the 
activity of identifying the semantic meaning of a particular use of language 
in context.  Construction is the activity of applying that meaning to 
particular factual circumstances.”68 
The two different pictures or models of interpretation articulated by 
distinguished New Originalists can be displayed graphically.  In Figure 2 
below, the Whittingtonian model appears on the left.  It is simply the two-
output model presented earlier, with two modest revisions.  First, the 
second stage that produces the second set of outputs is renamed.  That stage 
had previously been labeled “creation” to indicate merely that it is a 
creative endeavor that aims to produce something new, and in that way is 
distinguishable from the interpretive activity of trying to discover what 
already exists.  We now label it “construction” because that is the New 
Originalist name for this creative activity.  We take this to be a 
nonsubstantive change. 
Second, we have added the qualifier “fixed” to indicate that, on the 
standard originalist version of the two-output model, the first output—the 
law—is unchanging (absent formal constitutional amendment).  
Nonoriginalist adherents of the two-output model do not accept that 
particular claim about the legal norms that interpretation is supposed to 
deliver. 
The diagram on the right aims to capture Larry Solum’s alternative 
version of neo-originalism.  The absolutely critical point is that it differs 
from the Whittingtonian picture in presenting semantic meaning (or rather, 
and more precisely, communicative content),69 and not law, as the output of 
constitutional interpretation.  On the Solumine view, construction is always 
required to produce anything that counts as law.  The law can enter the 
scene only when ushered in by an episode of construction. 
So, how does construction operate in Solum’s picture?  Although we 
doubt that there exists a clear or definitive answer to this question, we read 
Solum and Barnett to identify at least two paths.  Often, construction 
generates general legal norms—norms such as unreasonable searches are 
unconstitutional, and sex- or gender-based classifications violate the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection if not substantially related to 
an important governmental interest.  (On the Whittingtonian picture, the 
former norm is almost certainly the product of interpretation, whereas the 
latter would be the product of construction; on the Solumine model, both 
norms, qua norms, are the product of construction.) 
 
 67. Solum, supra note 64, at 107. 
 68. Barnett, supra note 36, at 66. 
 69. Recall our earlier proviso, supra note 15, that, given our limited purposes in this 
Article, we will dispense with distinguishing these two kinds of linguistic contents.  Given 
his purposes, Solum rightly distinguishes them. 
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Other times, courts resolve constitutional disputes without pausing to 
announce any general constitutional norms:  they might simply hold that 
this particular statute or governmental action violates this or that 
constitutional provision.  As we read Solum and Barnett, they treat legal 
tests or rules and legal holdings that are reached without the mediation of a 
legal rule as equally the “law” that construction is called upon to deliver.  
We have tried to capture this view of construction by depicting alternative 
paths by which construction may legitimately proceed after interpretation.  
The path on the left represents construction by means of “translating the 
linguistic meaning into legal doctrine.”70  The path on the right represents 
construction by means of “applying or implementing the text.”71 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.  Resolution 
Thus far, it is not entirely clear that other neo-originalists or anyone else 
need to disagree with Solum.  For Solum is careful to acknowledge that his 
definition of “constitutional interpretation” as the process or activity of 
trying to discern the linguistic or semantic meaning of the constitutional 
text is stipulative.  He does not deny (though he may in fact doubt) that 
 
 70. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 71. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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many or most constitutional lawyers and theorists, originalists included, 
conceive of constitutional interpretation as the process or activity of trying 
to determine the Constitution’s legal meaning or effect.  As Ronald 
Dworkin has observed in a different context, “Nothing turns on which way 
we speak so long as we make plain what further point we wish to make in 
speaking that way.”72 
But therein lies the rub.  We have no reason for challenging whatever 
stipulations Solum and Barnett wish to make, unless their stipulations get in 
the way of theoretical insight or progress.  One point that these theorists 
apparently wish to make, or a goal they hope to achieve, is to advance the 
debate between originalism and nonoriginalism by clarifying for the 
participants what precisely has been in dispute.  We believe that their 
idiosyncratically narrow conception of constitutional interpretation actually 
prevents them from realizing that worthy goal.73 
This worry would not arise if Solum and Barnett, although defending a 
narrower conception of the target or output of “interpretation” than we 
believe is standard among both neo-originalists and nonoriginalists, 
nonetheless defended a conception of construction that somehow ended up 
committing them to (OL) or (OLˈ) or some close variant, and also located 
this conception within originalism.74  If they had done both of these things, 
then the difference between the standard (Whittingtonian) neo-originalist 
view of constitutional interpretation displayed on the left and the Solumine 
view displayed on the right would have amounted to little more than a 
negligible difference in bookkeeping.  All relevant parties would have 
agreed that originalism properly understood is committed to the proposition 
that the constitutional norms in our polity are constituted ultimately by the 
fixed semantic meaning of the constitutional text—with a proviso that the 
meanings of some provisions would be subject to refinement when they fail 
to furnish sufficient guidance because of vagueness or other semantic 
indeterminacy.  The only difference between the two groups would have 
been that the former would have conceived semantically determined 
constitutional norms as products of “interpretation,” whereas the latter 
would have conceived them as products of the combined efforts of 
“interpretation” and “construction.” 
However, Solum and Barnett do not make either of these claims and it is 
very doubtful that they could.  First, given the active and creative nature of 
construction, it is unclear how they could have a conception of construction 
that is committed to (OL) or (OLˈ) as a thesis about what the ultimate 
criteria or determinants of constitutional law are, rather than as a thesis 
about how to conduct constitutional adjudication.  In other words, even 
though Solum and Barnett strongly intimate that when interpreted semantic 
 
 72. Ronald Dworkin, Hart and the Concepts of Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 95, 98–99 
(2006). 
 73. For more elaborate argument along these general lines, see Mitchell N. Berman, 
Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision Rules:  Thoughts on the Carving 
of Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 39 (2010). 
 74. See supra Part II.A–B. 
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meaning is unambiguous and not vague courts should (absent, perhaps, 
exceptional circumstances) construct “doctrine” that mirrors that semantic 
meaning, it is hard to see how the arguments they must muster for this 
proposition would amount to the neo-originalist contention that the law is 
determined or constituted by the text’s fixed semantic meaning, as opposed 
to the older originalist contention that judicial decisionmaking that follows 
this prescription is desirable or required.  Even if Solum and Barnett were 
to maintain that judges engaged in “construction” are legally obligated to 
convert the semantic meaning of constitutional provisions into legal norms 
with the same content or effects, that would still fall short of the neo-
originalist claim—voiced, as we have seen, by such card-carrying 
originalists as Calabresi, Lund, Paulsen, and Prakash—that the semantic 
meaning of the text constitutes the law all by itself.  To understand the 
difference, imagine yourself in the shoes of a conscientious legislator who 
is committed to following the law.  On the view held by Calabresi et al., 
that commitment has content:  there is law out there, legally binding on 
legislators even before the courts perform their constructions.  In contrast, 
on the view that we are attributing, hypothetically, to Solum and Barnett, 
there is no law for you to obey before the process of construction, only 
semantic meanings of the text.  (For comparison, suppose that you are 
legally obligated to build Jones a house.  Obviously, that alone would not 
entail that the house already exists and that Jones is legally entitled to it.)  
Second, both authors appear to reduce originalism to a claim about 
constitutional interpretation.  As noted in the introduction, Barnett has 
stated expressly that a theory of construction supplements originalism, 
rather than being a component of it.75  And Solum has offered broadly 
similar remarks.76 
The upshot is that, by turning originalism into a semantic thesis, Solum 
and Barnett are compelled to attribute to nonoriginalists the denial of the 
claim that the semantic meaning of the constitutional text is fixed, not just 
the denial of the claim that the legal meaning of the Constitution is fixed.  
As Barnett observed:  “To the extent they are offering a method of 
 
 75. This has not been Barnett’s consistent position.  In his widely cited 1999 article, 
Barnett suggested that constitutional construction was called for only when the semantic 
meaning of the constitutional text was “underdeterminate” or could support “more than one 
rule of law.” Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 
645–46 (1999).  It is even unclear from that piece whether Barnett believed that original 
meaning exhausted a proper interpretation, let alone a proper construction.  Whereas the 
current Solum-Barnett picture paints original meaning as the alpha and omega of 
interpretation (though not of adjudication), Barnett had endorsed the more modest position 
that “original meaning should be the starting point of constitutional interpretation.”  Id. at 
648. 
 76. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 64, at 109 (“Originalists use the [interpretation-
construction] distinction to mark the difference between the Originalist enterprise of 
determining the linguistic meaning of the Constitution . . . and the nonoriginalist enterprise 
of specifying the content of constitutional doctrine where the Constitution is vague (or 
otherwise underdeterminate).”).  Admittedly, this passage leaves matters a little unsettled 
because it does not indicate whether the enterprise of specifying the content of constitutional 
doctrine when the semantic meaning is not “vague (or otherwise underdeterminate)” is 
properly characterized as “originalist.” Id. 
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interpretation, [nonoriginalists] are making empirical claims about the 
semantic meaning of the text of the Constitution today, or the semantic 
meaning of what the Supreme Court has said in its opinions.”77  But the 
suggestion that a thesis of what could be called semantic variantism is any 
recognizable part of nonoriginalism, let alone the dominant or central 
commitment, strikes us as plainly mistaken.78  The dispute between 
originalism and nonoriginalism is a legal dispute, not a semantic or 
linguistic one.79  Both originalists and nonoriginalists could do a better job 
than, by and large, they have been doing in incorporating the well-
confirmed results of linguists and philosophers of language, and such 
results may have clear-cut, hitherto-overlooked implications for the legal 
points in contention.  But up to this point, the issues in contention between 
originalists and nonoriginalists have been legal issues as to what legal 
implications semantic facts have, even assuming the fixity of meanings.  In 
short, the critical distinction that New Originalists should strive to capture 
is between the activities of (a) finding, discovering, or inferring the law, and 
(b) refining, supplementing, or (possibly, in some cases) revising that law.  
The important distinction does not lie between (c) finding the semantic 
meaning of the constitutional text, and (d) devising the law that reflects the 
found meaning in varying degrees. 
To be sure (and to play Stanley Fish for a moment), we disavow any 
authority to insist that “constitutional interpretation” is the activity of 
discovering the law.80  If Solum or others feel strongly that interpretation 
should be reserved exclusively for semantic inquiries, we need not quarrel.  
What we do insist is that, if “constitutional interpretation” were defined this 
way, then originalism cannot, absent radical revision, be conceived as an 
account of constitutional interpretation.  Originalism is almost universally 
understood as a legal thesis of some sort—that is, as pertaining, for 
example, either to the content of law or to the obligations of judges—and 
not as a theory of the semantic meaning of the constitutional text.  Put 
 
 77. Barnett, supra note 36, at 70. 
 78. It may be worth observing that originalists like Solum and Barnett assume that 
semantic meanings of constitutional texts are not only fixed, but fixed by the understanding 
of the writers and the audience at the time of Framing and ratification.  In fact, however, 
some work in the philosophy of language and mind would support the view that the semantic 
meaning of the constitutional text is not fixed by the understandings of the writers and their 
audience at the time of writing, even as those understandings are reflected and summed up in 
contemporaneous dictionary entries.  The loci classici here are a number of seminal articles 
included in TYLER BURGE, FOUNDATIONS OF MIND (2007). 
 79. Solum and Barnett both try to gain mileage from the fact that, in contract law, 
“interpretation” is a search for the communicative content of an agreement, while 
“construction” operates upon that communicative content to generate the contract’s legal 
effect.  We think that the analogy between constitutions and contracts is less tight than they 
do, in part because the former are sources of law and the latter are not.  Ultimately, more 
needs to be said on this score, of course.  Here we wish simply to flag a concern. 
 80. See Stanley Fish, Intention Is All There Is:  A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s 
Purposive Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109, 1133 (2008) (“It is certainly 
true that if you want to call something (including flipping a coin for that matter) 
interpretation, I can’t stop you.  And, as a matter of fact, I don’t have a strong stake in the 
word interpretation.”). 
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another way, Solum’s allowance that “[o]riginalists typically believe that 
the text operates as a constraint on other methods,”81 does not, in our view, 
come close to identifying or distinguishing the thesis that self-described 
originalists have vigorously defended, and that their critics have strenuously 
challenged, in thousands of law review pages over the past decades. 
IV.  THE NEW ORIGINALIST THEORY OF LAW:  
BRIEF CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
The preceding Part offered a formulation of the neo-originalist account of 
the ultimate criteria or determinants of constitutional law and then sought to 
bolster the attribution of that formulation to neo-originalists by 
highlighting, and critiquing, a distinct position that Solum has pressed in 
many articles and that Barnett has also endorsed, though (in our view) more 
equivocally.  (Still more equivocal, perhaps, are the views of Jack Balkin, 
another originalist who has famously embraced some version of the 
interpretation-construction distinction.)82  This penultimate Part briefly 
explains why all this matters—how the shift in originalist thinking from a 
theory of adjudication to a theory of law bears on the larger debate between 
originalists and their opponents, the nonoriginalists.  That explanation 
emerges from our investigation of a separate question:  Insofar as neo-
originalism is chiefly committed to a particular thesis concerning the 
ultimate criteria or determinants of American constitutional law—the view 
roughly captured by (OL) and (OLˈ)—what arguments do the neo-
originalists offer in support of that thesis?  That is, what could make it the 
case that (OL), (OLˈ), or some close variant is true or correct, and what 
evidence could its proponents marshal in its support? 
As we read the literature, neo-originalist defenses of (OL)—we will drop 
references to (OLˈ) and its variants henceforth for ease of exposition—
 
 81. Solum, supra note 30, at 461. 
 82. Some things Balkin says could suggest that he shares the Solum-Barnett view that 
interpretation delivers semantic meaning and not law.  For example, after identifying several 
uses of the word “meaning,” Balkin insists, “Fidelity to ‘original meaning’ in constitutional 
interpretation refers only to . . . the semantic content of the words in the clause.” JACK M. 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 13 (2011).  But he also appears to believe that the semantic 
content of the constitutional text constitutes the law.  This is the charitable interpretation of 
his repeated assertion that “the text of the Constitution is law,” for he surely knows that a 
text is not itself law, but bears some relation to law—e.g., the text may have been produced 
to reflect the law, its content may be constitutive of the law, its content may furnish evidence 
of what the law is, etc. Jack M. Balkin, Must We Be Faithful to Original Meaning?, 7 
JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 57, 59 (2013); see also BALKIN, supra, at 55 (“[T]he text 
continues in force today because it is law.”).  In his more careful moments, accordingly, 
Balkin speaks of “[t]he aspects of meaning that become law.” Id. at 71.  In short, then, we 
understand Balkin to be closer to the Whittingtonian than the Solumine picture.  Most likely, 
his view is precisely the one we identified as a possibility in Part I:  “constitutional 
interpretation does attempt to discover the Constitution’s semantic meaning, and by way of 
the semantic meaning also its legal meaning, only in consequence of the fact that the text’s 
semantic meaning is its legal meaning—i.e., that the semantic meaning constitutes the law.” 
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  What arguments Balkin musters for this view is a 
complex matter that we hope to address and evaluate in the depth that it requires on a later 
occasion. 
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assume one of three basic forms.  The three are metaphysical, moral-
political, and legal arguments, respectively.83  Metaphysical arguments for 
(OL) maintain that (OL) follows inescapably from the nature of something 
or other.  Common, if generally underdeveloped, claims along these lines 
are that (OL) follows from the nature of interpretation, of constitutions, of 
written documents, of law, of authority, or of democracy.  Moral-political 
arguments generally maintain:  first, that (OL) is the best view of the 
criteria or determinants of our constitutional law that we can adopt—that is, 
doing so will promote or realize, better than any alternative, democratic 
values, rule of law values (like stability and predictability), aggregate 
human welfare, or the like; and second, that we have the freedom to adopt 
it—i.e., that there are no metaphysical or legal obstacles to our choosing, 
and thereby making true, any particular account of the determinants of law.  
Legal arguments maintain that (OL) is a fundamental legal fact of our 
system.84 
It is well beyond the scope of this Article to critique these many and 
diverse arguments, although one of us has made a start at tackling the job 
elsewhere.85  Here, we settle for offering just three thoughts. 
First, extant metaphysical arguments for (OL) indicate that neo-
originalists systematically underestimate the difficulty of making plausible 
metaphysical arguments, and that their arguments consequently fall 
woefully short of making an adequate case.  At a minimum, a proponent 
would have to make the case that facts that all or most observers would 
count as relevant data could not be satisfactorily explained unless (OL) is 
conceived as a constitutive, nonoptional part of the relevant phenomenon—
e.g., interpretation of written texts, authoritative directives, democratic 
polity, etc.  In other words, the proponent would have to make a convincing 
case that all apparent instances of the relevant phenomenon that does not 
involve (OL) count as nongenuine instances of the kind, or at best as only 
defective or degenerate instances.  The key is not only to insist on these 
claims, but to make these claims on the bases of certain data that everyone 
involved would concede are the data that need to be explained, and to show 
that such data could not be accounted for without treating (OL) as 
constitutive of the relevant phenomenon.  And any verdicts that treat some 
apparent instances of the relevant phenomenon as nongenuine or degenerate 
instances run great risks of question begging.  Given these hurdles, it is 
unsurprising that the metaphysical arguments have been in marked decline 
of late.  Nonoriginalist legal and constitutional practices (that is, practices 
 
 83. The metaphysical/moral-political distinction is a close cousin to the hard/soft 
distinction offered in Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 84. Cf. Solum, supra note 30, at 460 n.17 (“Within the originalist family of theories, the 
Constraint Principle is justified in different ways.  For example, it could be argued that 
constraint is required by popular sovereignty (democratic legitimacy), by the nature of the 
constitution as a written text, by rule-of-law concerns, or by institutional concerns about 
discretionary power of unelected judges.  It can also be argued that constraint is required by 
legal norms—although this leaves open the possibility that the legal norms should be 
changed.”). 
 85. See generally Berman, supra note 83. 
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that by all appearances flout (OL)), not to mention theories of such 
practices that portray them as uncommitted to (OL), are too common across 
the globe, and are too prominent within our own experience to make 
plausible that they are incompatible with the very nature of law, of 
constitutionalism, of democracy, or any such.  Thus Whittington, for one, 
appears to accept some metaphysically contingent or optional nature of 
(OL)—which is compatible with moral-political or legal necessity—when 
he acknowledges that “methods of constitutional interpretation . . . are 
themselves ultimately a matter of constitutional construction.”86  We take 
this to mean that we can, by an act of collective will, choose legal principles 
or norms that will make it the case that the legal meaning or significance of 
the constitutional text just is its original semantic meaning, or some 
alternative set. 
Second, there are some compelling reasons to doubt the moral-political 
arguments for (OL) as well.87  To begin, if, as the neo-originalists have it, 
originalism is centrally a theory of the ultimate criteria or determinants of 
our constitutional law, and not, contrary to the old originialists, merely a 
theory of adjudication, and if that neo-originalist theory of the criteria or 
determinants of our constitutional law were conceived not as a true account 
of the nature of things, but instead as an implication or consequence of 
some evaluative or pragmatic assessments, then neo-originalists end up 
abandoning one of their main lines of argument against nonoriginalists.  
That is, they abandon their argument that nonoriginalists, motivated by 
wishful thinking, bad faith, or something else just as discreditable, are 
changing the subject by invoking extralegal considerations to address legal 
questions. 
Moreover, once we acknowledge that arguments of consequence and 
principle bear on what the determinants of our law are, then all the 
nonoriginalist arguments that originalists have wanted to treat as out of 
bounds or irrelevant are back in play.  These include arguments like how 
nonoriginalism is necessary to reach particular legal judgments that the 
polity is deeply committed to, and about the circumstances in which 
circumscribed forms of nonoriginalism yield more predictable judicial 
 
 86. Whittington, supra note 12, at 127.  Although we are not persuaded by this line of 
thought, it appears to us more defensible than an alternative line that we can also discern in 
some of Whittington’s writings.  In some of his earlier writings, Whittington seemed to think 
that the nature of written documents makes a commitment to (OL) nonoptional. See, e.g., 
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION chs. 3–4 (1999); Whittington, 
supra note 2; see also Barnett, supra note 75.  But almost immediately after outlining his 
metaphysical arguments, Whittington says that his originalist conception is “not the only 
possible conception of the significance of a written text,” and proceeds to discuss some 
alternative conceptions, thereby undermining his own metaphysical thesis. WHITTINGTON, 
supra, at 61–76. 
 87. To be clear, metaphysical arguments and moral-political arguments are not meant to 
be completely mutually exclusive.  Some could argue that (OL) is constitutive of, and not 
merely conducive to realization of, some moral or political ideal, such as that of democracy 
or rule of law.  We intend our observation about metaphysical arguments to cover such 
metaphysical moral-political arguments.  Our observations in the current paragraph in the 
text are meant to cover nonconstitutive moral-political arguments for (OL). 
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decisionmaking than does strong originalism.  That is, we would have to 
consider how all the various nonoriginalist accounts of law or legal practice 
stack up, relative to (OL), on all the evaluative or pragmatic dimensions 
that plausibly matter.  We emphasize both appearances of “all” in the 
previous sentence:  it will not do to measure (OL) against only some fairly 
extreme “living constitutionalist” accounts; nor will it do to treat some 
particular dimensions of value (say, stability or predictability) as 
conclusive.88  Although we obviously cannot undertake that comparison 
here, we conclude with one observation:  nonoriginalism, by definition, 
“owns the field.”  It could be that (OL) dominates all comers, but it would 
require a very high degree of optimism, verging on blind faith, to bet on it.  
It should be readily apparent to all that neo-originalists have so far hardly 
offered any systematic and compelling arguments—as opposed to fairly 
bald assertions with some hand waving—as to which principles, values, 
and/or consequences are worth satisfying or realizing.  Nor have they 
marshaled real empirical evidence to substantiate the hypothesis that 
adhering to (OL) is really the best means to achieve or satisfy whatever 
goals or side-constraints are in play.  Certainly, they have not offered 
anything that approximates the standards of contemporary political 
philosophy and social sciences, respectively. 
Finally, we do believe that the correctness or incorrectness of (OL) is a 
legal matter, and that arguments for or against it should turn on legal 
considerations, as opposed to metaphysical or moral-political 
considerations.  What is important to notice here is that legal arguments for 
(OL) are so far highly doubtful at best.  A significant glitch in the 
argumentation has been a defective self-understanding of those who have 
provided various arguments for (OL).  All too often, their arguments have 
been infected with various metaphysical and moral-political considerations 
that are at the end of the day irrelevant, ineffective, and liable to sidetrack 
the debate.  It was one of the main goals of a recent companion piece to this 
Article to encourage the participants in the debate about originalism to 
realize that the correctness or incorrectness is really a legal matter, and that 
there is no shortcut provided by metaphysics or moral philosophy.89  With 
an increasing realization of that fact, we surmise, the debate about 
originalism and its competitors will proceed more efficiently and 
productively.  Even if resolution forever eludes us, locating the irresolvable 
conflicts to precise joints of the theoretical structure would be considerable 
progress indeed. 
V. AN ILLUSTRATION 
In his contribution to this symposium, Solum introduces a hypothetical 
based on the Third Amendment to highlight the difference between his 
conception of the role for construction and a competing conception 
 
 88. For similar points, see Greenberg, Legislation As Communication?, supra note 11, at 
230, 252–55. 
 89. See generally Berman & Toh, supra note 29. 
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pursuant to which construction arises only when an agent sees herself as 
confronting an interpretive problem.90  In this final Part, we modify the 
hypothetical and repurpose it to illustrate the differences among old 
originalism, mainstream neo-originalism, the Solum-Barnett variation on 
neo-originalism, and nonoriginalism. 
Suppose that, during peacetime but with good reason, Congress sends 
troops to a residential area.  To house the troops, the government requests 
the consent of area homeowners.  Some owners grant consent, others 
withhold it.  Several owners who consented to the quartering of soldiers in 
their houses are not, however, owner-occupiers:  the houses that these 
owners have offered for the lodging of troops are occupied rental units.  
Suppose further that many of these renters do not consent to the quartering 
of soldiers in their rental homes.  Accordingly, they file suit in district court 
arguing that the quartering, without their consent, violates the Third 
Amendment, which provides that “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be 
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of 
war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”91  Granting that the original 
public meaning (and the original intended meaning) of “Owner” in this 
provision meant owner—essentially, one who holds property in fee 
simple—the plaintiffs nonetheless argue:  (i) that the limitation to owners 
issued from a now-anachronistic ideological bias in favor of the landed 
classes and against landless laborers—a bias that, among other things, 
supported the imposition of property qualifications for voting;92 and also 
(ii) that the limitation fails to respect the importance our society accords 
privacy interests in the home, regardless of whether those who live in the 
home own it.93  For these reasons, they contend, the law is properly 
understood, or this provision is properly interpreted, to require that the 
government secure consent from the renter-occupiers of any house in which 
they wish to quarter troops.  Relying on the text’s original meaning, the 
government argues that consent is required only from owners and not 
renters. 
How should the court rule?  The varied approaches we have canvassed in 
this Article would resolve that question, more or less, as follows. 
 
 90. Solum, supra note 30, at 496–99. 
 91. U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 92. For a general discussion of this historical bias in colonial and revolutionary times, 
see Donald A. Krueckeberg, The Grapes of Rent:  A History of Renting in a Country of 
Owners, 10 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 9 (1999). 
 93. In the one judicial opinion interpreting the Third Amendment that we have 
discovered, a panel of the Second Circuit credited arguments like these en route to holding 
“that property-based privacy interests protected by the Third Amendment are not limited 
solely to those arising out of fee simple ownership but extend to those recognized and 
permitted by society as founded on lawful occupation or possession with a legal right to 
exclude others.” Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1982); see also id. at 968 
(Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I reject a literal reading of the 
Third Amendment, which, on its face, appears to protect only fee simple owners of 
houses.”).  In the discussion in text, though, we are assuming away the existence of this or 
any other judicial decision arguably on point. 
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Old originalism:  Judges should interpret “Owner” in accord with its 
original meaning, and thus rule against the plaintiff renters, because any 
other approach facilitates or makes inevitable giving effects to wishful 
thinking and bad faith on the part of unelected judges. 
Mainstream neo-originalism:  Because constitutional law (in this case of 
first judicial impression) is fully determined by the original public 
meaning of the constitutional text, and because the original public 
meaning of the Third Amendment required consent to peacetime 
quartering only from owners, it is the law that only the owner’s consent is 
required, and courts should rule against the plaintiff renters insofar as they 
should follow the law. 
Solumine New Originalism:  The communicative content of the Third 
Amendment is, in relevant part, that only the owner’s consent, and not 
that of renters, is required to authorize peacetime quartering; whether it is 
also the law that only the owner’s consent, and not that of renters, is 
required to authorize peacetime quartering depends upon the scope of a 
judge’s obligation to construct constitutional doctrine that is consistent 
with the communicative content of the constitutional text, a matter that 
originalism rightly understood cannot resolve, although it is true that 
many originalists believe that judges do have such an obligation. 
(Pluralistic) nonoriginalism:  Even assuming that the semantic meaning 
of the Third Amendment does not require a renter’s consent to peacetime 
quartering,94 it remains entirely possible that our constitutional law does 
require a renter’s consent; what the law does require in this case likely 
depends upon the interplay of the ultimate legal principles in our 
constitutional system, which principles most plausibly include regard for 
human dignity and respect for property and privacy interests, even of 
persons who do not own their residences. 
We believe that the debate over originalism would be advanced by viewing 
it, more clearly than has been done thus far, as a contest between the views 
we have labeled mainstream neo-originalism and (pluralistic) 
nonoriginalism.  We also believe that the latter is the better view—though 
we cannot, of course, defend that judgment in this Article.95 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has advanced three central claims.  First, of whatever 
changes or shifts might be fairly identified in the overall spirit or tenor of 
originalism in recent years (say, over the past two decades or so), one is a 
general (but not universal) shift from viewing the task as advising what 
judges should do when resolving constitutional disputes to developing 
 
 94. It seems to us that this is not entirely a clear-cut matter.  See the intriguing 
discussion of such matters in Soames, Interpreting Legal Texts, supra note 15, at 410–12 
(discussing the matter of whether statutory language of “vegetables” includes tomatoes, 
which are botanically speaking fruits rather than vegetables). See also John Perry, 
Textualism and the Discovery of Rights, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN 
THE LAW, supra note 11, at 105. 
 95. We have taken a first stab at the defense elsewhere. See Berman & Toh, supra note 
29. 
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accounts of what determines the contents of true propositions or norms of 
constitutional law.  The new originalist position, in a nutshell, holds that 
some version of the semantic meaning of the constitutional text comprises 
or determines the content of the constitutional law.  This is a shift of 
genuine jurisprudential significance. 
Second, although it has not been widely recognized by contributors to the 
originalism literature, the version of originalism that Solum and Barnett 
have been championing is only a semantic thesis, not a legal one.  This 
version, we believe, is a highly revisionist account of the theory that most 
originalists have advanced and that most critics have challenged. 
Third, the new originalist theory of the determinants of law is neither 
entailed by the nature of written documents, interpretation, democracy, 
constitutionalism, etc., nor obviously implicated by any evaluative or 
pragmatic considerations.  Originalists who continue to maintain that courts 
should follow the original meaning of the constitutional text because that 
fixed meaning determines the law face a steep legal mountain ahead that 
they have yet to climb. 
 
